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THEORETICAL REVIEW
Thematic roles: Core knowledge or linguistic construct?
Lilia Rissman1,2 & Asifa Majid3
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
The status of thematic roles such as Agent and Patient in cognitive science is highly controversial: To some they are universal
components of core knowledge, to others they are scholarly fictions without psychological reality. We address this debate by
posing two critical questions: to what extent do humans represent events in terms of abstract role categories, and to what extent
are these categories shaped by universal cognitive biases? We review a range of literature that contributes answers to these
questions: psycholinguistic and event cognition experiments with adults, children, and infants; typological studies grounded in
cross-linguistic data; and studies of emerging sign languages. We pose these questions for a variety of roles and find that the
answers depend on the role. For Agents and Patients, there is strong evidence for abstract role categories and a universal bias to
distinguish the two roles. For Goals and Recipients, we find clear evidence for abstraction but mixed evidence as to whether there
is a bias to encode Goals and Recipients as part of one or two distinct categories. Finally, we discuss the Instrumental role and do
not find clear evidence for either abstraction or universal biases to structure instrumental categories.
Keywords Semantics . Concepts and categories . Psycholinguistics . Cognitive development
Introduction
Thematic roles such as Agent, Patient, and Goal have a long-
standing presence in theories of linguistics and cognitive sci-
ence. By way of illustration, the verb eat encodes a relation
between someone who eats and something that gets eaten:
these participants have been given the role labels Agent and
Patient, respectively. Thematic roles are routinely invoked in
studies of the syntax~semantics interface, language produc-
tion and comprehension, and child language learning. They
are argued to be part of innate, core knowledge (Carey, 2009;
Strickland, 2016), to be cross-culturally universal (Fillmore,
1968), and to have played a pivotal role in language evolution
(Calvin & Bickerton, 2000). Despite this prevalence, discus-
sion of the problematic nature of thematic roles also has a
long-standing tradition. Dowty (1991) states “there is perhaps
no concept in modern syntactic and semantic theory which is
so often involved in so wide a range of contexts, but on which
there is so little agreement as to its nature and definition, as
THEMATIC ROLE” (p. 547). Nearly 20 years later,
Newmeyer (2010) evinces a similar sentiment: “there is no
construct as murky in ANY subdivision of linguistic theory
as that of ‘thematic role’. Literally dozens have been proposed
over the years, and nothing approaching a consensus has been
achieved in terms of delineating the set that are needed for
natural language semantics” (p. 689).
The literature documenting the murkiness of thematic roles
is in fact so vast that we take it as given that individual roles
cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions, at least, not in a way that has explanatory and predictive
power in cognitive science (Cruse, 1973; DeLancey, 1991;
Dowty, 1991; Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2005; Schlesinger,
1989). Taking the example of the Instrument role, a wide
range of participants have Instrument-like properties
(Koenig, Mauner, Bienvenue, & Conklin, 2008; Nilsen,
1973; Rissman & Rawlins, 2017; Schlesinger, 1995):1
1 In this paper, role labels such as "Instrument" are used intensionally to refer
to a proposed mental category. Lower-case labels such as "instrument" are
used extensionally to refer to a particular entity which may or may not be a
member of a role category.
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(1) a. Janine ate the custard with a spoon.
b. Wanda accidentally drew on her shirt with a marker.
c. Renée applied the lipstick with her fingertips.
d. Carlos carried the milk in a bucket.
e. Anita went to Amsterdam by train.
f. The cue ball hit the red ball which sunk the eight ball.
g. Tyrell used the steamy room to practice yoga.
h. The bomb blast destroyed the abandoned factory.
i. The program completed the algorithm in five seconds.
We defy readers to propose a single generalization that
captures what all these roles have in common (without being
so broad as to include, say, all event participants).
Despite the difficulty of defining thematic roles, 50 years
after the publication of Fillmore’s seminal 1968 paper “The
case for case,” thematic roles are still common in scientific
parlance and theory because of the possibility that they are
fundamental to how human minds develop, how we represent
the world, and how we express these representations in lan-
guage. And although thematic roles are definitionally opaque,
this makes them no different from other human concepts
(Malt, Gennari, Imai, Ameel, Saji, & Majid, 2015). In one
view of the relationship between language and thought, lan-
guage develops “by linking linguistic forms to universal, pre-
existing representations of sound and meaning” (Hespos &
Spelke, 2004: p. 453). Applying this nativist view to the the-
matic role Agent, for example, it may be that Agent is a uni-
versal conceptual category present early in life that remains
largely unchanged throughout development. It is well-
established that the syntax~semantics interface is variable
across languages (Bowerman & Brown, 2008; Croft, 2012;
Rappaport-Hovav & Levin, 1998). The semantic structures
encoding thematic roles, and the conceptual structures inter-
facing with these semantic structures, may vary relatively lit-
tle, however.
Such a state of affairs would have wide-ranging implica-
tions for theories of linguistic representation, language devel-
opment, and event representation.Many generative theories of
syntax and semantics encode agency via the primitive predi-
cate Ag(e) in the truth-conditions of a sentence (Kratzer, 1996;
Lohndal, 2014; Parsons, 1990; Schein, 2002; cf. Davidson,
1967). The truth-conditions of Jim drank champagne, for ex-
ample, would contain the proposition Ag(e) = Jim, where e is
a linguistic representation of an event. Across languages, di-
verse linguistic forms contribute agency to the meaning of a
sentence (e.g., nominative case in one language, ergative case
in another). Nonetheless, if the nativist view of agency is
correct, then the semantic content ofAg(e) is the same in every
language. For children, if the nativist view of agency is cor-
rect, language learning would involve discovering which lin-
guistic form(s) encode the role Agent, rather than constructing
this category based on conceptual, linguistic, and cultural ex-
perience; and for adults perceiving events in the world,
recognition and conceptualization of agents would proceed
in the same way in every cultural context.
A variety of evidence suggests that for the Agent role, the
nativist view may in fact be correct. The strength of this evi-
dence does not, however, imply that all thematic roles are
innate universals. For the Recipient, Goal, and Instrument
roles, evidence for the nativist view is more tenuous: the cur-
rent literature on these roles is more consistent with theories in
which conceptual and linguistic categories are constructed,
and influence each other over the course of development.
On closer examination, even for the Agent and Patient roles,
the nativist view is not fully supported because we lack the
detailed behavioral evidence required to fully understand the
structure of these categories. Previous studies have focused
more on elucidating the relationship between roles, rather than
uncovering the structure of individual roles. Without a de-
tailed understanding of how role categories are structured,
we cannot address whether roles are truly cross-linguistically
universal.
We support this argument in two steps. First, we ask wheth-
er thematic roles correspond to psychologically real catego-
ries. The human ability to create categories is ubiquitous, en-
abling us to interpret and learn from new experiences. As
such, when humans encode events and the relationships be-
tween event participants, we expect a priori that event partic-
ipants are represented in terms of categories. The existence of
lexically-specific roles (e.g., one who eats, thing that gets eat-
en) is fairly uncontroversial. However, one can also ask
whether there are abstract categories that range over
lexically-specific roles, for example, a category that includes
not only the thing that gets eaten, but also the thing that gets
cleaned, broken, and so forth. Such abstractions would sup-
port novel verb learning, efficient sentence processing and
rapid event apprehension, among other cognitive abilities.
In the psychological study of concepts, categories are often
probed through studying the meanings of words – researchers
have asked, for example, about the structure of the category
bird. Thematic roles, however, often do not map cleanly onto
words. For example, although agent, patient, and instrument
are English words, there is only a loose connection between
the commonly known meanings of these words and the event
categories that researchers have labeled Agent, Patient, and
Instrument. Instead, role categories have been thought to re-
veal themselves through a range of linguistic structures, both
lexical (e.g., case markers, adpositions) and syntactic (e.g.,
grammatical functions such as Subject and Object). In addi-
tion, lexical markers of thematic roles are often closed-class
and have wide semantic extension, seemingly encompassing
multiple meanings and multiple thematic roles. The English
preposition with, for example, marks instruments, as in (1a),
but it also ranges over other roles, as in I want the room with
two beds, Marnie delivered the talk with confidence, and I
walked to the store with my brother.
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Given that event participant categories are not as self-
evident as categories provided by nouns and verbs, we review
studies demonstrating the psychological reality of abstract
roles. It is clear that a variety of event- and verb-specific
knowledge is activated during sentence comprehension
(Bicknell, Elman, Hare, McRae, & Kutas, 2010; Ferretti,
McRae, & Hatherell, 2001; McRae, Ferretti, & Amyote,
1997; McRae, Hare, Elman, & Ferretti, 2005; Metusalem,
Kutas, Urbach, Hare, McRae, & Elman, 2012). For example,
the sentence the journalist checked the spelling is processed
more quickly than the mechanic checked the spelling
(Bicknell et al., 2010). Given this detailed event- and verb-
specific knowledge, in combination with the difficulty of de-
fining and identifying thematic roles, the question arises as to
whether abstract participant categories have a place in a theory
of cognition. They may be useful labels in research but lack
psychological reality, akin to the “comparative concepts” in
Haspelmath (2010). As described by Haspelmath, compara-
tive concepts are “specifically designed for the purpose of
comparison [across languages]” (p. 664). That is, they are part
of the linguist’s toolkit rather than an aspect of human cogni-
tion to be studied in and of itself.
Additionally, some theories of the syntax~semantics
interface do not employ thematic roles in their machin-
ery. The analysis in Croft (2012), for example, involves
direct mappings between specific event structures and
syntactic positions (e.g., Subject and Object), rather than
incorporating abstract roles. In addition, Rissman and
Rawlins (2017) analyze the meanings of the English
instrumental markers with and use only in terms of the
roles Agent and Patient, without appealing to the role
Instrument. Theories of language and cognition that do
without thematic roles, or employ a more restricted set
of roles, may be simpler and therefore preferred. It is
crucial, therefore, to put forward evidence that proposed
thematic roles have psychological reality. Such evidence
is found in experiments on event and sentence process-
ing by adults and children, which we review below.
The second step of our argument is to address whether
abstract roles in specific languages and cultures are shaped
by universal biases in conceptual and semantic structure.
Fillmore (1968), for example, proposed that the repertoire of
role categories is the same across languages. This hypothesis
is not possible to test directly (at least not yet; see fifth sec-
tion), because experimental studies demonstrating abstract
roles have not been conducted in every language.
Nonetheless, we review four types of evidence that bear on
this question indirectly: linguistic typology, studies of concep-
tual representation in infancy, sign language emergence, and
studies of child language development. As core knowledge is
a source of universal cognitive biases, this evidence can be
used to support the claim that thematic roles are part of core
knowledge.
Linguistic typology involves comparing large sets of di-
verse languages. Through patterns of colexification across
languages, this research sheds light on the extent to which
there are universal biases to categorize event roles: when a
single adposition or case marker is frequently used to encode
two distinct meanings, this indicates that the two meanings are
semantically related; when two meanings are frequently
marked in different ways linguistically, this indicates that the
meanings are semantically more distant. This colexification
evidence thus shows common patterns in what types of roles
are often distinguished and what roles are often conflated. As
the very nature of categories is to distinguish in-group from
out-group members, these patterns suggest what notions are
regularly distinguished in diverse languages and consequently
give clues as to what the categories in individual languages are
likely to be.
Even if the same psycholinguistic tasks were conducted on
all the languages of the world, and the categories turned out to
be the same, we would still not know why languages/cultures
are the same. Common patterns cross-linguistically could re-
flect cognitive biases, social structure, historical and environ-
mental influences, or some combination of these factors. We
therefore review evidence from infancy, emerging sign lan-
guage, and child development: developmental data are critical
to reveal notions distinguished early in life before language
has been fully acquired, and thus provide insight into the cog-
nitive biases that individuals begin their learning with. For
example, representations that develop early in life are likely
to reflect fundamental biases that structure cognition. So stud-
ies with infants can reveal conceptual knowledge about event
roles that is in place before children have fully learned the
grammar of any particular language. Studies of newly emerg-
ing sign languages also reveal cognitive predispositions re-
garding concepts that lend themselves to be readily encoded
in language, but in this case in the context of language being
created rather than learned. Finally, child language learning
can reveal whether particular role categories are more salient
than others. To the extent that children's language develop-
ment is not a straightforward mirror of the language input they
are receiving, child language reflects “the conceptual similar-
ities perceived by children among paradigms or structures,
evenwhere these similarities are obscured by the conventional
forms of the language” (Clark & Carpenter, 1989: p. 22).
In previous discussions of how thematic roles structure
cognition, roles have generally been considered in the aggre-
gate: that is, the question “are thematic roles universal?” has
been posed for thematic roles as a class. In this paper, to the
contrary, we suggest the answer to this question may differ
depending on the particular role considered. For this reason,
we review three types of roles, addressing whether there is
evidence for abstract categorization, as well as evidence for
universal cognitive biases. We begin in the next section with
the Agent/Patient roles, which have been by far the most
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extensively researched, and which provide the strongest evi-
dence both for abstract role categories and universal biases
that structure these categories. We find strong evidence for a
universal bias to distinguish agents and patients. In
the following section, we discuss events of transfer and crossing
space, which are typically analyzed as involving a Goal/
Recipient and Source. Here we address the question of whether
there is a universal bias for goals to be categorized more robust-
ly than recipients, an asymmetry that would support the hypoth-
esized primacy of spatial cognition. We find minimal evidence
for such a bias, raising the possibility that categorization of
Goals and Recipients is more variable than categorization of
Agents and Patients. We discuss instrumental events in the
fourth section, which are typically analyzed as an Agent acting
on an Instrument in order to affect a Patient. We ask whether
there is a universal bias to construct an instrument category
around the notion of a tool, a physical object wielded by an
agent in order to achieve an outcome. Across the three types of
roles considered here, we find the weakest evidence that uni-
versal biases shape role categorization for instrumental events.
In addition to questions of category abstraction and univer-
sal biases, a third crucial question for theories of thematic roles
is how these categories are structured. A commonly adopted
answer to the question of category representation is that roles
have prototype structure (Ackerman & Moore, 2001; Dowty,
1991; Gärdenfors, 2014; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Lakoff
& Johnson, 1980; Luraghi, 2003; Primus, 1999). In Dowty’s
(1991) theory of English argument realization, for example,
the properties of being sentient, causative and volitional are
Proto-Agent properties, whereas being causally affected and
undergoing a change of state are Proto-Patient properties. Just
as with the classic work on categorization conducted by Rosch
and colleagues (see Hampton, 1995; Murphy, 2002; Rosch,
1975; Rosch &Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978), representing the-
matic roles in terms of prototypes provides a solution to the
problem that they cannot be defined in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions. The experimental work critical to proto-
type theories of objects has largely not been conducted with
thematic roles, for the simple reason that word meanings pro-
vide only an indirect cue to the structure of role categories. In
the fifth section, we discuss how this gap could be filled in the
future.
In the fifth section, we also provide a roadmap of the stud-
ies that should be conducted to fully test the nativist view of
thematic roles. We argue in this paper that for multiple roles,
there is only weak evidence for the nativist view. We stress,
however, that the literature is more often characterized by
absence of evidence (the critical studies have not been con-
ducted) rather than negative evidence (findings contrary to the
nativist view). We conclude this paper by discussing what
some of these critical studies would be.
Across the cognitive sciences, thematic roles are most often
invoked within the language sciences, and within linguistics,
thematic roles are typically understood to be linguistic repre-
sentations whose theoretical function is to explain and predict
syntactic behavior, for example, through syntactically-
oriented theta-roles (Baker, 1988; Chomsky, 1981; Marantz,
1984; Reinhart & Siloni, 2005), event representations (Croft,
2012; Jackendoff, 1990; Rappaport-Hovav& Levin, 1998), or
logical structures (van Valin & LaPolla, 1997). At the same
time, thematic roles are also event participant categories,
which although reflected in language through specific linguis-
tic structures, are not exclusively represented at a linguistic
level. It therefore follows that evidence from sources outside
of the confines of linguistics – including studies of infant and
adult event cognition – are pertinent to understanding the full
nature of thematic roles. Logically it is possible, of course, that
there are multiple domain-specific thematic role representa-
tions, one that modulates syntactic behavior and another that
modulates conceptual event representation, for example. In
this review, we assume as a null hypothesis that, even if there
are such domain-specific roles, there is also a domain-general
system of event participant categories, and both linguistic and
non-linguistic behavioral evidence is relevant toward under-
standing the nature of these categories. Finally, although we
describe role abstractions as categories, we do not presuppose
a particular theory of the syntax~semantics interface: the idea
that there are abstract roles is compatible with theories where
individual roles are representational primitives, as well as with
theories in which abstract event structures such as [X CAUSE
[Z HAVE Y]] map to syntax, and the categories correspond to
positions in these abstract structures (Jackendoff, 1990;
Rappaport-Hovav & Levin, 1998).
Agents and patients
Behavioral evidence for abstract agent and patient
categories
Many theorists have argued that our action representations
center around two maximally distinct participants
(Gärdenfors, 2014; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980). Gärdenfors (2014), for example, proposes
that “the agent and the patient of an event model are the two
most central examples of thematic roles” (p. 165), and that the
prototypical event involves an agent initiating a force vector
that causes a change of state in a patient. The existence of
abstract Agent and Patient roles in specific languages/
cultures is supported by studies of event cognition and sen-
tence comprehension. For example, adults rapidly extract
agent and patient role information from visual presentation
of events. Hafri, Papafragou, and Trueswell (2013) presented
English-speaking adults with scenes of transitive events, such
as a girl pushing a boy, for brief intervals (either 37 or 73 ms).
Even at the shortest interval, participants were able to answer
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questions with above-chance levels of accuracy for questions
such as “is the boy performing the action?” or “is the boy
being acted upon?”. Although participants could succeed at
this task if they only extracted event-specific roles (i.e., some-
one who pushes, someone being pushed), the rapid processing
displayed by participants suggests they are using a more ab-
stract schema for decoding events. The findings of Hafri,
Trueswell, and Strickland (2018) support this interpretation.
Participants viewed simple transitive events and performed a
task unrelated to roles (they had to spatially locate a particular
gender or shirt color of the people in the event). Nonetheless,
participants were slower when the role (Agent vs. Patient) of
the target (e.g., the person in the blue shirt) was different from
the role of the target in the previous trial. This indicates that
people extract role categories (specifically Agent and Patient
categories) during visual event apprehension, even when they
are not asked to attend to event roles.
Decades of psycholinguistic research also shows that adults
activate thematic role knowledge in sentence comprehension
and prediction, and most of this research focuses on the Agent
and Patient roles (Altmann, 1999; Boland, Tanenhaus,
Garnsey, & Carlson, 1995; Carlson & Tanenhaus, 1989;
Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003; Kim & Osterhout,
2005; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994;
Mauner & Koenig, 2000; Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Garnsey,
1994). For example, Mauner and Koenig (2000) found that
readers could easily interpret a sentence like the vase was sold
to collect money for the charity. As the rationale clause to
collect money for the charity requires an agent semantically,
this finding indicates that readers activated an Agent concept
upon hearing the verb sold. By contrast, readers did experi-
ence difficulty interpreting the vase sold to collect money for
the charity. Other studies have identified brain regions such as
the left mid-superior temporal cortex that encode abstract
Agent and Patient roles, during written sentence comprehen-
sion (Frankland & Greene, 2015), as well as viewing of ani-
mated videos (Wang, Cherkassky, et al., 2016). In the last
decade, language comprehension research has focused on
the precise timing of thematic role assignment, with debate
as to whether role interpretation is delayed relative to other
types of information (see Chow & Phillips, 2013; Chow,
Smith, Lau, & Phillips, 2016; Kim, Oines, & Sikos, 2016;
Kowalski & Huang, 2017; Kukona, Fang, Aicher, Chen, &
Magnuson, 2011). Nonetheless, the idea that agent- and
patient-like roles are assigned relatively rapidly during com-
prehension is uncontroversial.
Knowledge of abstract Agent and Patient categories is also
manifest through studies of novel verb interpretation. For
example, Kako (2006) asked English-speaking adults to read
sentences without contentful open-class words, such as the
rom mecked the zarg. Even for such seemingly meaningless
sentences, participants rated the Subject as having more
agentive properties than the Object, and the Object as having
more patient-like properties than the Subject, indicating that
abstract role information is linked to syntactic positions. Two-
year-old children also interpret novel sentences such as Elmo
blicked Miss Piggy as referring to an event where Elmo is an
agent and Miss Piggy is a patient (Arunachalam & Waxman,
2010; Lidz, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 2003; Naigles, 1990;
Noble, Roland, & Pine, 2011; Savage, Lieven, Theakston, &
Tomasello, 2003) and children display sensitivity to Agent
and Patient categories in sorting and language production
tasks (Angiolillo & Goldin-Meadow, 1982; Braine & Wells,
1978; Braine, Brooks, Cowan, & Tamislemonda, 1993;
Bridges, 1984; Corrigan & Odya-Weis, 1985; Corrigan,
1988).
This array of evidence shows that agent-like and patient-
like participants are represented in terms of abstract catego-
ries. The status of putative Agent and Patient roles is not
necessarily identical, however. For a range of English verbs,
White, Rawlins, and Van Durme (2017) clustered arguments
by semantic features considered definitive of Agent and
Patient roles, such as having intention and undergoing a
change of state (Dowty, 1991). While a clear Agent cluster
emerged, the patient-like arguments clustered into four sepa-
rate roles, subtypes of a more diffuse Patient role. The idea
that Patient is a more diffuse category than Agent is consistent
with findings in Hafri et al. (2013). These authors hypothe-
sized that agents, when physically instantiated, tend to be
characterized by perceptual features such as outstretched
limbs and leaning forward. By contrast, patients were hypoth-
esized to be characterized by the absence of these features. For
still images of an animate agent acting on an animate patient,
agents were more consistently judged as having these features
than patients were judged to not have them, suggesting that
the Patient role is more heterogeneous than the Agent role.
Although intriguing, it is not clear to what extent this finding
would generalize to other sorts of events or stimuli, such as
events with inanimate agents.
A universal bias to distinguish agents from patients
Behavioral effects from individual languages, such as priming
from one type of event to another, constitute evidence for
abstract event participant categories. As most of the studies
reviewed in the section above were conducted with speakers
of English, the question of whether the same abstract role
categories are shared across the languages of the world has
largely been unanswered. Nonetheless, typological evidence
provides an indirect clue as to what meanings are commonly
distinguished across languages, and therefore how role
categories are likely to be structured. Aggregating evidence
from a wide range of languages reveals a robust tendency to
distinguish agents from patients. Dryer (2013) documented
word orders for 1,377 languages and found that 86% of these
languages distinguish agents from patients by virtue of having
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a dominant word order. This statistic does not imply that 14%
of the sampled languages do not distinguish agents from pa-
tients; this 14% includes, for example, languages like Dutch
and German, which have SVOword order in main clauses but
SOV word order in embedded clauses. Siewierska (2013)
sampled 380 languages and found that among those
languages that use verbal person marking to code
arguments, none attested a single person marker for both
agents and patients, while using a different person marker
for the single argument of an intransitive verb. In his study
on case marking, Comrie (2013) found a similar tendency to
distinguish agents from patients: across 190 languages, no
language received the same case marker for agent and patient
arguments of a transitive verb, but a different case marker for
the single argument of an intransitive verb (see also Comrie,
1978).
This dispreference for grouping agents and patients togeth-
er may not be truly universal, however: Payne (1980) docu-
ments a case-marking pattern in which agents and patients are
colexified for some Iranian languages, albeit for only some
pronouns. While such counter-examples suggest that
distinguishing agents from patients is not a descriptive univer-
sal, these counter-examples are still compatible with a strong
tendency to distinguish agents from patients. Finally, in a
study of lexically-specific roles (e.g., BEATER, BEATEE),
Hartmann, Haspelmath, and Cysouw (2014) studied 25 genet-
ically diverse languages to establish whether they distinguish
roles morphosyntactically. They used multidimensional scal-
ing to analyze the similarity between each of the specific roles
and found that agent-like roles (e.g., BEATER, PEELER,
SIPPER) and patient-like roles (e.g., BEATEE, RECEIVED
THING, COOKED FOOD) clustered distinctly from one
another.
Before proceeding further, some caution is warranted. The
typological evidence reviewed above –whether the same form
encodes two distinct meanings – often reflects the researchers’
rough-and-ready notions of Agent and Patient. For this reason,
the distinction between agents and patients that we see across
diverse languages is not truly independent of the particular
role categories in the minds of the researchers (see
Newmeyer, 2010). Nonetheless, the fact that these rough-
and-ready notions were still highly likely to be encoded by
two distinct forms across languages, and that other notions do
not show the same proclivity (as reviewed later), can be taken
as indicative of a strong pan-human bias to draw this
distinction.
While the typological evidence reveals a bias to distinguish
agents from patients, evidence from emerging sign languages
and infancy suggests this bias is rooted in cognition. When
deaf children are born to hearing parents and are not taught a
sign language, they often invent their own gestural systems
(“homesign”) to communicate (Goldin-Meadow, 2003) – sys-
tems which oftentimes share the linguistic properties of
established languages. Goldin-Meadow and Mylander
(1998) found that homesigning children from the USA and
Taiwan encoded a distinction between agents and patients in
their homesign. When these children were describing events
with two participants, such as a mouse eating cheese, they
were more likely to produce a sign for the patient than for
the agent. More importantly, agents and patients were pro-
duced using consistent word orders, for example, producing
patients before acts (e.g., CHEESE-EAT). These findings
show a tendency to distinguish agents from patients that
emerges even among childrenwho are not learning a linguistic
system from their caregivers. Rissman and Goldin-Meadow
(2017) found that a single child homesigner from the USA
developed a morphological form for expressing causation,
again indicating sensitivity to the category of Agent and pro-
pensity to encode this category in language (all of the causers
that the child described were animate, thus agents).
Grammatical devices for distinguishing agents from pa-
tients also emerge early in sign language communities. New
sign languages come into being when deaf people join a com-
munity where they are not taught an existing sign language
but are free to sign with each other, as when a community
opens a school for special education, or high rates of congen-
ital deafness lead to many deaf people within extended fami-
lies. Dynamics of language emergence are often studied by
separating signers into distinct generations or “cohorts”: the
first generation of signers has a signing community but does
not receive a sign system as input. Subsequent generations
learn the language that the older deaf members of the commu-
nity had been using. Nicaraguan Sign Language (NSL)
emerged about 50 years ago: even the earliest cohort of NSL
uses word order to distinguish animate agents from inanimate
patients (although word orders were more variable when both
the agent and patient are animate; Flaherty, 2014). Ergin,
Meir, Ilkbaşaran, Padden, and Jackendoff (2018) studied de-
scriptions of transitive events among speakers of Central
Taurus Sign Language (CTSL), which emerged about 50
years ago. The first generation of CTSL did not appear to
use a consistent linguistic device to distinguish agents from
patients, but the second and third generations did, using word
order, spatial reference, character assignment, and causal
chaining. The village sign language Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign
Language (ABSL) emerged about 80 years ago – when
signers from the second generation of ABSL produced utter-
ances with an agent and a patient, they consistently used SOV
word order (Sandler, Meir, Padden, & Aronoff, 2005; Padden,
Meir, Sandler, & Aronoff, 2009). Together, these results dem-
onstrate that when signers in different cultures around the
world create new languages, distinguishing agents from pa-
tients has high priority.
Experiments with infants provide a final piece of evidence
for a cognitive bias to distinguish agents from patients. Before
infants have learned verbs, adpositions, or syntactic structures
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of any particular language, they represent events in terms of
conceptual structures thought to be definitive for agent- and
patienthood (see Carey, 2009; Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Kelso,
2016 for review). For example, 6-month-old children repre-
sent causal relations between objects (Leslie, 1984a; Leslie &
Keeble, 1987; Meltzoff, Waismeyer, & Gopnik, 2012;
Muentener & Carey, 2010; Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey,
2005; Saxe, Tzelnic & Carey, 2007). Infants also represent
actions in terms of the goals of an agent, an important precur-
sor for understanding intentionality (Adam, Reitenbach, &
Elsner, 2017; Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003; Csibra,
Gergely, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999; Gergely & Csibra, 2003;
Krogh-Jespersen & Woodward, 2014; Leslie, 1984b; Wagner
& Carey, 2005; Woodward, 1998; Woodward, 2003). For ex-
ample, Woodward (1998) showed that by 6 months of age,
infants analyze reaching events in terms of the goals of the
agent (e.g., the object the agent is reaching for), rather than a
perceptually organized analysis of the agent’s movements.
Infants are also sensitive to social aspects of an agent’s action,
preferring pro-social, helping agents to antisocial, hindering
agents (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Hamlin, Wynn,
Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011). Crucially, many of these experi-
ments feature events that would be unfamiliar to infants, such
as blocks and balls moving in a seemingly autonomous man-
ner. This suggests that infants have an abstract agency schema,
allowing them to interpret novel, unfamiliar events as goal-
directed.
Summary
Even if the roles Agent and Patient cannot be defined in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions, the evidence reviewed
above suggests a universal bias to encode Agent and Patient
categories distinctly from each other. These roles guide cog-
nitive and linguistic processing in adults, they are distinctly
coded cross-linguistically, they shape language emergence at
an early stage, and are part of young infants’ conceptual
knowledge. In the first section, we sketched a nativist view
of thematic roles: they are cross-culturally universal, present
early in life, and change little over the course of development.
The strength of the evidence presented here suggests that this
strong view may be true for Agent and Patient roles. It would
be premature, however, to endorse this position, as too little is
yet known about the structure of these roles in individual
languages. Recall, for example, the research indicating the
Patient role in English is more diffuse and heterogeneous than
the Agent role. This may be indicative of a broader cross-
linguistic trend, where a universal bias to distinguish agents
from patients is in fact a universal bias to distinguish agents
from all other types of participants. Alternatively, other lan-
guages may differ from English in having a more tightly clus-
tered Patient role or a more heterogeneous Agent role. More
in-depth cross-linguistic research is needed to address these
possibilities, and their implications for the nativist view of
thematic roles, as we discuss in the fifth section.
The strength of the findings on agents and patients have led
some to the more general conclusion that thematic roles as a
class are part of core knowledge (see Strickland, 2016). The
range of events that we are able to represent and describe,
however, is much more varied than the prototypical case of
an agent acting on a patient, as demonstrated by example (1).
We next consider events involving goals, recipients, and
sources, and ask whether our representations of these events
are shaped by universal cognitive biases.
Recipients, goals, and sources
Behavioral evidence for abstract recipient and goal
categories
Across proposed lists of thematic roles, frequently listed can-
didates are Recipients (e.g., Paul gave the focaccia to Mary)
and Goals (e.g., Mary walked to the bakery). Studies of adult
sentence processing have shown that adults activate informa-
tion about recipients and goals upon hearing verbs that encode
these participants (e.g., teach activates recipient, enter acti-
vates goal) (Andreu, Sanz-Torrent, & Rodríguez-Ferreiro,
2016; Boland, 2005). More importantly, priming studies with
adults show the order of thematic roles can be primed inde-
pendently of syntactic structure, indicating abstract knowl-
edge of a Goal category (Chang, Bock, & Goldberg, 2003;
Ziegler & Snedeker, 2018) and a Recipient category (Cai,
Pickering, & Branigan, 2012; Cho-Reyes, Mack, &
Thompson, 2016; Hare & Goldberg, 1999; Köhne,
Pickering, & Branigan, 2014; Pappert & Pechmann, 2014;
Salamoura & Williams, 2007; Ziegler, Snedeker, &
Wittenberg, 2018), categories that transcend verb-specific
knowledge. For example, Chang et al. (2003) found that
English speakers were more likely to produce sentences where
the goal was mentioned in the second position after the verb
(e.g., the farmer heaped straw onto the wagon) when primed
by a sentence with the same thematic order (e.g., the maid
rubbed polished onto the table) than a prime sentence where
the goal was in the first position (e.g., the maid rubbed the
table with polish).
Infants, even as young as 10 months, represent an abstract
Goal category when viewing motion events. For example,
Lakusta, Spinelli, and Garcia (2017a) familiarized 10- and
14.5-month-olds to events of an agentive entity moving to
different goals, for example, a duck moving up to a tree (an
AT-path event) or onto a box (an ON-path event). At test,
infants looked longer at an event of a duck moving out of a
bowl (a source path) than moving into a bowl (an IN-path
event), indicating the infants had generalized IN-path events
as being part of the same category as AT-path and ON-path
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events. Synthesizing the adult and infant studies, we find ro-
bust evidence that for motion and transfer events, people rep-
resent event participants in terms of abstract Goal and
Recipient categories.
A thornier question concerns the relationship between the
Goal and Recipient categories. These two thematic roles oc-
cupy a similar semantic space: in Reba threw the ball to
Ronnie, for example, Ronnie could be construed as either a
Goal or a Recipient. Nonetheless, Recipients are typically
characterized in terms of transfer (of an object, or of informa-
tion) to an animate participant, whereas Goals are typically
characterized in terms of the endpoint of a spatial path. Are
Goals and Recipients distinct categories that happen to over-
lap, or are they subtypes within a single overarching category?
In many dominant theories of the language~cognition inter-
face, spatial representations are considered fundamental, with
non-spatial meanings extended metaphorically from spatial
meanings (Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1972, 1983; Heine,
Claudi, & Hünnemeyer, 1991; Tyler & Evans, 2003). We
might therefore expect that Goal constitutes the central mem-
ber of this overarching category, with Recipient a less proto-
typical instance of this category – that transfer is a metaphor-
ical extension of motion along a path.
Ziegler and Snedeker (2018) tested these two hypotheses
about the relationship between goals and recipients. In a lan-
guage production study with English-speaking adults, they
found the order in which a goal was mentioned in a sentence
did not prime the order in which a recipient was mentioned, or
vice versa (e.g., hearing the boy sprayed water on the plant,
where the goal is second, did not lead to more sentences such
as the woman fed the strawberry to the goose, where the
recipient is second). Minimally, these results indicate that in
English, priming draws on distinct Goal and Recipient
categories; but the results are also consistent with the
stronger hypothesis that for adult English speakers, Goal and
Recipient are representationally distinct. Along these lines, de
Cuypere (2013) analyzed the English preposition to and found
evidence against the proposal that to has a core spatial mean-
ing: the diachronic record of to shows that the earliest uses of
to were not restricted to spatial meanings.
No universal bias to represent recipients in terms
of goals
Existing behavioral and corpus studies of English do not pro-
vide support for the proposal that adults represent goals and
recipients in terms of a single abstract category, with Recipient
being a metaphorical extension of Goal. It is possible, howev-
er, that there is a general bias to represent recipients in terms of
goals, even if this asymmetry is not manifest in English. The
typological evidence does not support this possibility. Both
goal and recipient markers (also called allatives and datives,
respectively) have wide semantic extension cross-
linguistically (Blansitt, 1988; Haspelmath, 2003; Heine,
1990; Svorou, 1994; Næss, 2008; Lambert, 2010;
Malchukov, Haspelmath, & Comrie, 2010; Newman, 1996;
Rice & Kabata, 2007; Wälchli & Zúñiga, 2006). For example,
Rice and Kabata (2007) investigated the range of meanings
expressed by allative markers across 44 languages (where the
core use of an allative was defined as the goal of a motion
event, as in Jane walked to the store). Allative markers encode
many senses beyond that of a spatial goal: in Japanese, for
example, the allative marker ni is extended to 20 different
senses (see Kabata 2000). Some extensions are more common
than others cross-linguistically. Beyond marking goals, the
allative extends most commonly to recipients (e.g., Jane gave
a bagel to her dog), concepts (e.g., the idea occurred to me),
purposes (e.g., I left home to join the circus), and locations
(e.g., Japanese Musume wa Tokyo ni iru, “my daughter is in
Tokyo”). Similarly, dative markers regularly extend beyond
recipients to goals, beneficiaries (e.g., Jane bought me a
sandwich), predicative possessors (e.g., French: Ce chien est
à moi ‘This dog is mine (lit. to me)’), experiencers (e.g., the
proposal was outrageous to me), malefactive sources (e.g., I
robbed him of money), and patients (Haspelmath, 2003;
Malchukov et al., 2010).
Researchers have used this sort of data (i.e., how often
individual languages code distinct meanings with the same
form) to construct semantic maps, in which senses that tend
to be marked in the same way across languages are plotted
close to each other in a visualization of the overall data
(Haspelmath, 2003; Malchukov et al., 2010; Rice & Kabata,
2007). Across the board, goals and recipients are positioned
close to each other on these semantic maps, although the cen-
tral node of the map varies depending on whether the focus is
goal or recipient extension. Other studies also do not support a
strong distinction between these categories. For example,
Bickel, Zakharko, Bierkandt, and Witzlack-Makarevich
(2014) analyzed a genetically diverse sample of 114 languages
using cluster analysis, asking whether thematic role categories
could explain common patterns of non-default case marking.
Their analysis revealed no evidence for a distinct cluster cor-
responding to the goal of spatial transfer: the cluster contain-
ing the goal argument for ‘throw,’ ‘bring,’ and ‘send’ also
contained ‘give’ and ‘show.’ Similarly, in their study of 25
diverse languages, Hartmann et al. (2014) found no clusters
specific to goals or recipients: ‘giving recipient’was similar to
‘teachee,’ but also to ‘climbing goal,’ ‘wiped material,’ and
‘thought content.’ So the typological literature shows strong
linkages between goals and recipients, but no evidence that
one category is more robust than the other.
Turning to studies of homesign, there is evidence that child
homesigners encode a Recipient/Goal category. Goldin-
Meadow and Mylander (1984) studied ten homesigning chil-
dren from the USA, analyzing the order in which children
produced signs for agents, patients and recipients/goals (these
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authors’ coding collapsed recipients and goals into one cate-
gory). For nine out of ten children, two word-order patterns
were found: recipients were more likely to be ordered after
agents, and they were also more likely to be ordered after
patients. For three children, these patterns were statistically
significant within the individual child’s data. Moreover, the
broad range of lexical items used in the recipient/goal role
suggested that these word order patterns were not the result
of each child repeating a low-scope construction, such as
“GIVE FOOD ME.” These results add to the literature
reviewed above, and suggest people represent roles in terms
of abstract categories. In addition, they show the cognitive
robustness of these categories, as even child homesigners en-
code them through patterns of word order. In a later study,
Zheng and Goldin-Meadow (2002) distinguished recipients
from goals in their investigation of homesigners, and found
both American and Chinese homesigning children were more
likely to produce gestures for goals than recipients. This sug-
gests goals are cognitively more central than recipients, as
predicted by the idea that spatial representations are the foun-
dation for action representation (Gruber, 1965; Heine et al.,
1991; Jackendoff, 1972, 1983; Tyler & Evans, 2003)
Several studies of emerging sign languages have docu-
mented how signers describe events of transfer (for CTSL:
Ergin et al., 2018, ABSL: Sandler et al., 2005; NSL:
Senghas, Coppola, Newport, & Supalla, 1997). Nonetheless,
we are not aware of studies that have tested whether grammat-
ical devices for encoding goals emerge before grammatical
devices for encoding recipients (or vice versa).
If there is a general bias for Goal to be a more robust
category than Recipient, we would predict that sensitivity to
goals emerges in infancy before sensitivity to recipients.
Evidence from infants does not support this: sensitivity to
goals and recipients develops around the same time (roughly
the first birthday). As described above, Lakusta, Spinelli et al.
(2017) found that 10-month-olds represented an abstract cat-
egory of Goal. In a study of recipient encoding, Schöppner,
Sodian, and Pauen (2006) habituated infants to scenes of a
human-like puppet giving a flower to another human-like pup-
pet. Infants subsequently dishabituated to a switch in the roles
of the puppets (who was giver and who was recipient), but not
to a switch in the spatial locations of the puppets. This asym-
metry held for 10.5- and 12-month-olds, but not for 9-month-
olds. Tatone, Geraci, and Csibra (2015) familiarized 12-
month-olds to giving and taking events, and found infants
distinguished these two events and linked the ‘giver’ and ‘tak-
er’ roles to individual agents in the events.
Considering the close relationship we observe between
goals and recipients across a range of paradigms, a first pos-
sibility is that humans are biased to represent goals and recip-
ients in terms of a single thematic role centered around an
animate goal, as in Reba threw the ball to Ronnie. If so, this
super-category would have a vast extension, so as to capture
the range of meanings commonly encoded by allative and
dative markers cross-linguistically: from purposes and loca-
tions to experiencers, possessors, and patients. One problem
with such an account is that it may be too inclusive to have any
explanatory power.
We propose a second possibility here: our representations of
goals and recipients rely on two fundamental, but distinct cognitive
systems – spatial cognition on the one hand and social relation-
ships between animates on the other. The ability to represent spatial
relationships is a core cognitive ability, and spatially based meta-
phors and abstractions are widespread in language (Lakoff, 1987).
Nonetheless, social cognition is also fundamental, and the dative
may best be understood as involving a relationship between ani-
mate individuals where there is some intermediary between the
individuals, as inMarnie taught John Spanish. In her discussion of
dative extensions cross-linguistically, Næss (2008: p. 4) points to
the animacy of the recipient as a crucial factor: recipients are often
affected by an event, and are therefore patient-like, but recipients
are “less prototypical patients by virtue of their sentience” (see also
Grimm, 2011). This perspective helps explain why some of the
most common recipient-encoding verbs cross-linguistically, such
as ‘show,’ ‘teach,’ and ‘ask,’ only involve transfer in an abstract
sense (Haspelmath, 2011). Events of entities crossing space and
events of two animates interacting often overlap, as in Reba threw
the ball to Ronnie. An animate participant may be the endpoint of
a spatial path, and an animate participant may become affected by
virtue of receiving an object that has crossed space. Under this
second possibility, we observe categories of Goal and Recipient
because there are universal biases to represent events in terms of
movement along a spatial path, as well as social interaction be-
tween animates.
The evidence on goals and recipients is compatible with the
nativist view of thematic roles – they may be distinct, universal
categories that are present early in life and change little over
development. An alternate possibility is more likely, however,
given the diverse array of languages in which goals and recipi-
ents are colexified. The high semantic overlap of these roles may
lead to more cross-linguistic diversity. There may be languages
like English, where sentences with goals and recipients do not
prime each other (Ziegler & Snedeker, 2018), but there may also
be other languages where the roles do prime each other. As we
reviewed above, there is evidence that Goal and Recipient cate-
gories are present in infancy. Presuming that infants across cul-
tures have similar conceptual knowledge, it may be that catego-
rization of goals and recipients shifts over the course of develop-
ment, with adults categorizing these roles in more diverse ways
than infants.
Recipient/goals versus sources
The evidence reviewed above suggests the category of Goal is
not more cognitively robust than Recipient. Such an asymme-
try is present, however, between Goals and Sources, as in
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Tyrell got a book from the library. Sources are represented in
terms of an abstract category. Lakusta, Spinelli et al. (2017)
found, for example, that 14.5-month old infants generalized
over events with sources (e.g., a plane flying out of a bowl, a
bird walking away from a tree) when the source objects were
highly visually salient. In addition, Lakusta and Landau (2005)
found adults described source paths more often when they were
primed with a source-encoding verb such as unhook.
Nonetheless, behavioral experiments indicate the representation
of sources is less robust than goals (Lakusta & Landau, 2005;
Lakusta & Landau, 2012; Levine, Hirsh-Pasek, Pace, &
Golinkoff, 2017; Papafragou, 2010; Regier & Zheng, 2007).
For example, speakers across a range of languages are less
likely to mention sources than goals when describing events
(Lakusta & Landau, 2005; Lakusta & Landau, 2012;
Narasimhan, Kopecka, Bowerman, Gullberg, & Majid, 2012;
Papafragou, 2010), and adults show worse discrimination and
memory for sources than for goals (Lakusta & Landau, 2012;
Papafragou, 2010; Regier & Zheng, 2007).
This asymmetry is echoed by the typological literature. Cross-
linguistically, sources are often distinguished from goals/recipi-
ents, both in the motion domain (e.g., I walked to the store vs. I
walked from the store) and the transfer domain (e.g., I sent a
letter to my mother vs. I got a letter from my mother)
(Creissels, 2006; Rice & Kabata, 2007; Nikitina, 2009; Kabata,
2013; Bickel et al., 2014; cf. Wälchli & Zúñiga, 2006). Rice and
Kabata (2007) sampled 44 genetically diverse languages and
found the same marker was used for both goals and sources in
only 11% of instances. Bickel et al. (2014) provide further sup-
port for this distinction: in their analysis of non-default case
marking in 114 languages, they found source arguments (e.g.,
‘buy-from’ and ‘get-from’) clustered distinctly from a range of
other roles. Most importantly, Kabata (2013) surveyed 24 lan-
guages and found sources had a narrower scope of semantic
extension than goals, consistent with the behavioral evidence
showing Source is a less robust category.
Evidence from emerging sign languages and infancy sup-
ports these findings. Zheng and Goldin-Meadow (2002) stud-
ied descriptions of motion events from homesigning children
in the USA and Taiwan, and found children from both groups
produced gestures for goals and sources; but gestures for goals
were about five times as common as gestures for sources. In
addition, infants encode goals of motion events more robustly
than sources. Lakusta, Wagner, O'Hearn, and Landau (2007),
and Lakusta and Carey (2015) found that when 12-month-olds
were familiarized to events of a bird flying from one of two
sources to one of two goals, they increased their looking when
the bird flew from the same source to a different goal, but not
when the bird flew from a different source to the same goal
(see also Lakusta, Spinelli et al., 2017). Tatone et al. (2015)
also found infants encoded the absence of a recipient from a
giving event more strongly than the absence of a source from a
taking event.
Taken together, the typological evidence and studies with
adults, homesigners, and infants provide strong evidence for a
universal cognitive bias such that goals are represented more
robustly than sources. A possible factor contributing to this
asymmetry is that goals may provide new discourse informa-
tion more often than sources do – that is, an event with a goal
must also have a source, but an event with a source need not
have a goal (Lakusta & Landau, 2012). The consensus that
Sources are less robust than Goals, however, is potentially
inconsistent with Clark and Carpenter's (1989) study of chil-
dren learning English. The authors found a tendency for chil-
dren to overgeneralize the preposition from to agents, causes,
and possessors, as in he isn't going to get hurt from those bad
guys, suggesting conceptual relatedness between sources and
these three role types (see also Lakusta, Thothathiri, Mendez,
&Marinkovic, 2017). Clark and Carpenter interpret this result
as indicating the primacy of spatial cognition, and conclude
there is a broad category of Source that includes Agent. This
interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the infant research
that shows infants encode agents roughly six months before
they encode sources. An alternative possibility is that English-
learning children overgeneralize from because they are uncer-
tain about the category of meanings from picks out, rather than
because they represent a primary Source category.
Summary
The psycholinguistic literature provides robust evidence that
(English-speaking) adults represent events in terms of Goal
and Recipient categories that abstract beyond the verb-
specific and event-specific level. These categories appear to
be an important part of our conceptual and semantic reper-
toire: infants less than a year of age represent these (or similar)
notions, and deaf children lacking exposure to a language
model produce signs for these entities. In addition, humans
robustly distinguish sources from goals, as shown through
cross-linguistic research, adult psycholinguistic experiments,
and studies with infants. Nonetheless, it is unclear how our
concepts about recipients and goals are structured: are these
subtypes of the same category, or are they distinct categories
drawing on two distinct cognitive systems? Although the na-
tivist view of thematic roles is not decisively falsified by the
available evidence on recipients and goals, this evidence sug-
gests that there is greater variability in how these event partic-
ipants are categorized than in how agents are categorized.
Instruments
Evidence for an instrument category?
We now turn to the final type of thematic role reviewed here –
Instrument, introduced in (1) – and explore the evidence for an
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Instrument category. Instrument has a long-standing place in
discussions of thematic roles, dating back at least to the
Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini. Fillmore (1968) proposed that
Instrument is one of a small set of universal roles.
Instruments are often linked to concepts of agency and causa-
tion, as the extension of an agent or standing in a part-whole
metonymic relation (DeLancey, 1991; Dowty, 1991; Grimm,
2007; Luján, 2010; Rissman, Rawlins, & Landau, 2015;
Rissman & Rawlins, 2017; Schlesinger, 1989; van Valin &
Wilkins, 1996). That is, the function of an instrument is
thought to be essential to its meaning: being used by an agent
to achieve something. Like other thematic roles, Instrument
has been described as having prototype structure: Luraghi
(2001: 388) characterizes a prototypical instrument as “an
inanimate manipulable entity which occurs in a controlled
state of affairs, where an agent acts intentionally.” We refer
to this as the “tool” definition for convenience. This tool pro-
totype is exemplified by (1a), Janine ate the custard with a
spoon, and the other examples in (1) are assumed to be less
prototypical members of the category.
There is surprisingly little empirical evidence for the
Instrument category. Psycholinguistic studies have shown
specific verbs can activate instrumental concepts (Andreu
et al., 2016; Koenig, Mauner, & Bienvenue, 2002; Koenig,
Mauner, & Bienvenue, 2003; Rissman et al., 2015). For ex-
ample, in Koenig et al. (2003), participants read sentences
such as which sword did the rebels behead the traitor king
with? When the verb encoded the presence of an instrument
(e.g., behead as opposed to kill), participants were faster at
recognizing the wh-filler (e.g., sword) was an instrument rath-
er than a patient. This result indicates verb-specific encoding
of instruments rather than an abstract Instrument category. The
two words in English that most commonly introduce instru-
ments are with and use. These words do not obviously encode
Instrumental categories, however (Rissman & Rawlins,
2017): consider she impressed the committee with her
confidence and she used the hour before lunch to write a
letter. Rissman and Rawlins (2017) found the only generali-
zation uniting this range of meanings was: an Instrument is
“an entity, either concrete or abstract, acted on by an agent as
part of a larger event.” In the linguistics literature, a
commonly-used diagnostic to identify an Instrument is if both
the with- and use- versions of the sentence are possible (e.g.,
he ate ice cream with a spoon; he used a spoon to eat ice
cream; see Koenig et al., 2008; Lakoff, 1968; Nilsen 1973).
Problematically, this diagnostic assumes a priori an
Instrument category centered around the tool prototype.
Universal biases
The existence of an Instrument category is under-supported
empirically. Nevertheless, there could be a universal bias to
construct a participant category around the concept of a tool.
As discussed above, instruments are often analyzed as exten-
sions of agents, and this possibility is supported cross-linguis-
tically: agent/instrument colexification is common outside of
the Indo-European language family (Stolz, 2001). In the se-
mantic map constructed by Narrog and Ito (2007) based on
200 languages, the roles agent, passive agent, ergative, and
cause/reason are in close proximity to the instrument role.
Children learning English also appear to be sensitive to the
relationship between agents and instruments. Braine and
Wells (1978) trained 5-year-olds to place Actor, Object, and
Instrument tokens on pictures such as a soldier shooting with a
gun (Actor + Instrument tokens). In generalization trials with
three participants, such as the bear used a bat to break the
clock, children’s placement of the three tokens was highly
accurate. But in trials with only two participants, such as the
cake was cut with a knife, children were uncertain as to wheth-
er the non-object (here, the knife) was an Actor or an
Instrument.
In addition to the agent-instrument linkage, typological re-
search shows that instruments are closely linked to
comitatives (sometimes labeled “companions,” as in Coco
went to the store with Joelle) (Heine et al. 1991; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980; Luraghi, 2001; Nilsen, 1973; Schlesinger,
1995). Narrog and Ito (2007) found that having a single form
for instruments and comitatives was one of the most frequent
colexifications in their data set. The behavior of English with
lead Lakoff and Johnson (1980) to propose a cross-culturally
universal metaphor in which an instrument is conceptualized
as a companion. Contrary to this, it appears the comitative/
instrumental colexification is overwhelmingly common only
in Indo-European (Stolz, 1996, 2001), and not the rule when
considering a diverse range of language families.
In addition to agents and comitatives, instrumental
meanings colexify with themes, as in Gabe filled the glass
with orange juice. In their sample of 114 languages, Bickel
et al. (2014) did not find a clear separation between themes of
spatial transfer (such as for put and throw) and instruments
(such as for cover and hit). In other words, the object being
thrown (e.g., a ball) is often marked the sameway as the object
being used to cover (e.g., a blanket). These ‘throwee’ and
‘cover’ microroles demonstrate a linkage between themes
and instruments: both move through space from one location
to another, and both can be used intentionally to affect another
participant. Locative/instrumental colexification is also com-
mon: for example, in Troy cut the bread by hand and Troy
went to Amsterdam by train, the train is both a means of travel
and a container (see Luján&Ruiz Abad, 2014; Luraghi, 2004;
Narrog & Ito, 2007).
In sum, the typological literature exhibits a swathe of se-
mantic relationships between instruments and other meanings.
Given this, it is not obvious how one could capture all cross-
linguistically attested patterns within a single semantic notion.
The typological data are consistent with the proposal that there
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are no universal biases shaping howwe construct instrumental
categories. On the other hand, the typological data could also
be consistent with the proposal that humans are biased to
represent instrumental events in terms of a tool prototype, a
possibility we consider below.
The idea that tools are cognitively central is supported by
work in the infancy literature. By their first birthday, infants
represent tools as means through which an agent achieves her
goals (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Hofer, Hauf & Aschersleben,
2005; Jovanovic et al., 2007; Sommerville & Woodward,
2005). Stavans and Baillargeon (2018) found that 4-month-
old infants were able to individuate objects when they had
seen those objects used as tools, suggesting infants use infor-
mation about tool use to assist individuation. Crucially, infants
did not individuate objects when they were not used in a
typical tool-like fashion (e.g., when the experimenter
squeezed a pair of tongs together above a toy, rather than using
the tongs to lift a toy). When 11- to 12-month-old infants
observe novel objects being used functionally (i.e., as tools),
they categorize the objects based on the part of the object that
affords the function, rather than overall similarity (Träuble &
Pauen, 2007). Moreover, 13.5-month-olds are able to learn an
association between a tool and an end-state, even when the
means relationship between the two is opaque (e.g., after
covering a banana with a flowerpot, the banana magically
becomes peeled; Hernik & Csibra, 2015). The evidence that
infants can represent the functions of tools, and that they use
this to help them individuate objects, suggests tools are a
cognitively robust category. In addition, although Englishwith
is highly polysemous, the instrumental sense of with is one of
the earliest senses acquired by children (Clark & Carpenter,
1989; Tomasello, 1987).
Relatively few studies have addressed how instrumental
meanings are encoded in emerging sign languages, although
we do know that homesigning children label tools: Rissman,
Horton, and Goldin-Meadow (2018) studied nine children
fromGuatemala, Nicaragua, the USA, and Taiwan (age range:
2;11 – 12;0), and found all children produced signs referring
to tools. This evidence does not, however, reveal the
categories that these homesigners used to represent tools.
Several studies have investigated the morphological structure
of instrumental signs in ABSL and CTSL (Hwang, Tomita,
Morgan, Ergin, et al., 2016; Padden, Meir, Hwang, Lepic,
Seegers, & Sampson, 2013), although these studies have not
focused on the relationship between instruments and related
meanings (e.g., agents, comitatives, themes), so this still re-
quires further investigation.
To summarize, the nativist view of thematic roles may be
correct for Instruments, such that the tool is the prototype
within the Instrument category, and it could be a category with
universal relevance. However, the available evidence about
instruments is more limited than for either agent/patient roles
or recipient/goal/source roles. Although the current evidence
does not contradict the nativist hypothesis, there is little lin-
guistic or behavioral evidence that directly supports it either.
Instead, we see evidence for linkages between instruments and
a range of other roles, from agents and comitatives to locatives
and themes.
The future of research on thematic roles
In many ways, the current literature provides a detailed view
of event participant categories and how they influence linguis-
tic and cognitive behavior across a range of human popula-
tions. But there are a variety of gaps in the literature that
prevent us from knowing whether the nativist view of themat-
ic roles is correct for even a single role. In this section, we
discuss how these gaps could be filled. One of the most nota-
ble omissions concerns the structure of the categories. In the
section below, we discuss the prominent proposal that themat-
ic roles are structured in terms of prototypes, and some of the
limitations in extending prototype theory to thematic roles.We
also provide a roadmap for the types of studies that should be
done to fully test the nativist view of thematic roles.
Thematic roles and prototypes
There is already ample evidence that thematic roles defined in
terms of necessary and sufficient conditions are not universal,
at least not as far as the syntax~semantics interface is con-
cerned. For example, both nominative and ergative case
markers introduce agents, but these markers have different
extensions: only nominative case marks the single argument
of an intransitive verb such as run. Analyzing thematic roles in
terms of prototypes is the most common response to the ob-
servation that roles are not easily defined in terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions. And, given extensive cross-
linguistic variability, the proposal that thematic roles are part
of core knowledge may depend on thematic roles having pro-
totype structure.
The evidence reviewed illustrates that roles are represented
in terms of abstract categories and are present in infants and
deaf signers creating new languages. But the literature reveals
little about whether these categories have prototype structure,
and whether the prototypes are the same across languages.
Relatively few studies have used methods comparable to the
classic work in categorization conducted by Rosch and col-
leagues (see Hampton, 1995; Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis,
1975; Rosch, 1978). We summarize the relevant work here,
and suggest how it could be applied to the study of thematic
roles in the future.
The behavioral phenomena supporting prototype represen-
tations are well-documented (see Geeraerts, 2010; Hampton,
2006; Murphy, 2002; Rosch, 1978; for review). For example,
when people judge whether itemX is a member of category Y,
response times are faster when X is a more prototypical
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member of the category (e.g., people judge that robins are
birds more quickly than penguins are birds). Similarly, when
people are asked to list members of a category, prototypical
members are mentioned earlier, and more often (across peo-
ple). Also, hedging language is more acceptable for non-
prototypical members of a category than prototypical mem-
bers (a penguin is technically a bird vs. a robin is technically a
bird).
Although the idea that thematic roles have prototypes is
widespread, the classic methods used to establish prototypes
have rarely been applied to the study of thematic roles, for the
critical reason that these methods rely on lexical labels (e.g.
bird). As described in the introduction, role categories often
do not map cleanly onto words. For example, neither English
with nor use on their own point to the category Instrument, as
discussed above. Only the intersection of these terms corre-
sponds to intuitions about what a prototypical Instrument
might be. Given this asymmetry between event participant
categories and lexical meanings, the same methods that sup-
port prototype theories cannot be directly extended to the
study of thematic roles. As a consequence, claims about the-
matic role prototypes are often put forth without extensive
behavioral or cross-linguistic evidence, as pointed out by
Rice (1996).
Geeraerts (2010: 189) summarizes four types of
prototypicality effects: (1) differences of typicality and mem-
bership, (2) membership uncertainty, (3) clustering into family
resemblances, and (4) absence of necessary-and-sufficient
definitions. Not all categories demonstrate all four of these
effects. The category fruit, for example, demonstrates both
the first and second effects: first, apples and pomegranates
are both fruit, but an apple is a more typical exemplar than a
pomegranate. Demonstrating membership uncertainty, many
English speakers are unsure whether olives and coconuts are
fruits. The English category bird, however, demonstrates the
first characteristic but not the second: a robin is a better exam-
ple of a bird than a penguin, but for English speakers with a
particular educational background, the boundaries of the cat-
egory bird are discrete rather than fuzzy: a bat is not a bird, a
flying squirrel is not a bird.
Which of these four characteristics do thematic role cate-
gories demonstrate? As described in the first section, they
cannot be convincingly defined in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions. In the linguistics literature, thematic
roles are often thought to demonstrate the first effect, graded
typicality among members. Most notably, Dowty (1991) in-
vokes prototypes to explain the puzzle that in English, agents
generally appear as Subject and patients as Object (Tasha
kissed the baby has to mean that Tasha was the one doing
the kissing). Nonetheless, many types of participants appear
as Subject that are not particularly agentive, such as in Tasha
believed the news. Dowty’s proposal is that for each English
verb, the argument with the most Proto-Agent properties (e.g.,
sentience, causation, and volition) is realized as Subject, and
the argument with the most Proto-Patient properties (e.g., af-
fectedness, being an incremental theme) is realized as Object.
An argument does not have to be a good example of an agent
to appear in Subject position; it just has to have some Proto-
Agent properties. Grimm (2011) organizes Dowty’s Proto-
Role properties into a lattice structure, such that arguments
with all of the agentive properties are better examples of the
category Agent than arguments with fewer of these properties.
This Proto-Role approach has been extended to a range of
languages beyond English (Ackerman & Moore, 2001;
Grimm, 2011; Primus, 1999).
This type of linguistic graded typicality effect has not, how-
ever, been demonstrated for a wider range of behavioral data.
Nonetheless, existing behavioral methods can be extended to
test for graded typicality of thematic roles, as event processing
studies reveal asymmetries in how people identify and
remember different types of participants. As described in the
third section, Lakusta and Landau (2012) found in a change-
detection task that goals were remembered better than sources.
Dobel, Gumnior, Bölte, and Zwitserlood (2007) conducted an
event identification task, where participants viewed rapidly-
presented scenes of an agent transferring something to a re-
cipient (scene duration: 100–300 ms). Although both the
agent and the recipient were animate, participants were less
accurate at naming the recipient than the agent in the 200- to
300-ms window. If thematic roles are structured such that
some members of the category are more typical than others,
then a reasonable linking hypothesis is that in such tasks,
processing and memory will be more robust for the typical
members than for the atypical ones, ceteris paribus.
Consistent with this reasoning, note that the asymmetry
between source and goal demonstrated by Lakusta et al.
(2007) is only observed for animate entities such as a duck.
When Lakusta and Carey (2015) showed 12-month-olds
events of a balloon crossing from a source to a goal, infants
did not increase their looking to either the different-goal
events or the different-source events. This suggests the most
robustly encoded notion of Goal is narrower than the endpoint
of a crossing of space – it is the destination reached by a self-
directed entity. This in turn might suggest that the latter is the
more prototypical instance of the Goal category than the
former.
In the Recipient domain, one possibility is that physical
transfer is central: cross-linguistically, verbs of giving are by
far more common than other types of three-argument verbs
(Newman, 1996). Along similar lines, Tatone et al. (2015: p.
48) argue that infants possess a giving action schema, and that
“humans are equipped with a specialized cognitive adaptation
for understanding and participating in resource exchange.” If
the recipient of a physical transfer event is more prototypical
than the recipient of a communication event, thenmemory and
processing should be better for the former than for the latter. In
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the third section, we proposed that the Goal and Recipient
categories are underpinned by two fundamental cognitive sys-
tems (spatial vs. social cognition), and that one role is not
more primary than the other. We are not aware of any studies
that have directly tested whether processing of goals is more
robust than processing of recipients, so this remains a matter
for future investigation.
The second prototypicality characteristic discussed by
Geeraerts (2010) is that categories may have fuzzy bound-
aries, leading to uncertainty about whether a particular exem-
plar is a member of the category. In practice for researchers
trying to delimit where one thematic role ends and another
begins, this uncertainty is all too familiar. Consider, for exam-
ple, the contrast betweenMartha ate the custard with a spoon
and Martha sprayed the ferns with water. Some researchers
have analyzed the two underlined participants as members of
different categories, Instrument and Locatum, respectively,
under the justification that the latter sentence is fundamentally
an event of a substance crossing space, rather than an event of
tool manipulation (Jackendoff, 1990). Other researchers have
classified both the spoon and the water as Instruments, as they
are both used by an agent to achieve a goal (Koenig et al.,
2008). This issue of membership uncertainty has led to the
widespread confusion observed by Dowty and Newmeyer at
the outset of this paper. Drawing on the current example, the
water may be an atypicalmember of the category Instrument,
a typical member of the distinct category Locatum, or it may
not fit neatly into any category, as with the noun olive,
discussed above. Priming experiments such as in Ziegler and
Snedeker (2018) can address whether instruments and
locatum participants are part of the same category.
The third prototypicality characteristic is family resem-
blance. A well-known example concerns the different senses
of the English preposition over (e.g., the plane flew over the
city, he put his hands over his face): these have been argued to
be related by meaning chains, where some senses involve a
vertical arrangement and others involve physical covering,
etc. (Brugman, 1988; Lakoff, 1987; Taylor, 2003). These
types of meaning chains are explicit in the Proto-Role pro-
posals of Dowty (1991) and Grimm (2011), among others.
The typological literature reviewed in the second to fourth
sections also reveals which semantic relationships are partic-
ularly relevant for category membership across languages.
Goals, for example, are closely related to locations and pur-
poses, and instruments are closely related to agents and
themes. Sowe have a relatively well-developed understanding
of how similarity is defined within the semantic space of event
participant roles. In fact, the clearest alternative to the proposal
that thematic roles have prototype structure is that participant
roles are semantically related through chaining, without the
presence of a central reference point. In a study of how the
senses of English words changed over time, Ramiro,
Srinivasan, Malt, and Xu (2018) found that a model based
on nearest neighbor semantic chaining was more efficient than
a model based on a central prototype. Whether the same holds
for thematic roles is not known.
An additional question concerns the types of semantic fea-
tures that comprise the family resemblance structures in the-
matic roles. Dowty and Grimm, inter alia, propose abstract
features such as intentionality and causation. In the event cog-
nition experiments of Hafri et al. (2013), perceptual features
such as leaning and having outstretched limbs influenced how
quickly a figure was categorized as an agent. Verb-specific
typicality information (e.g., that the agent of a frightening
event is likely to be scary and unfriendly) has also been argued
to be part of thematic role structure (Ferretti et al., 2001;
McRae et al., 1997; see also Brown & Dell, 1987). Each of
these types of features may be part of role prototypes – it is
unknown, however, whether different cognitive and linguistic
behaviors rely on different sets of features.
roadmap for future research
The previous section described methods for testing whether
event participant categories have prototype structure. These
methods would enable researchers to establish not only
whether event participants are represented in terms of abstract
categories, but also to propose analyses of how the categories
are structured. In this section, we propose a variety of steps
that should be taken to more decisively answer the question of
whether event participant categories are influenced by univer-
sal cognitive biases and whether the nativist view of thematic
roles is correct.
The majority of experimental studies on event cognition
and memory have been conducted with speakers of English.
Studies in other semantic domains have tested whether proto-
types are variable across languages (color: Regier, Kay &
Cook, 2005; containers: Malt, Sloman & Gennari, 2003).
Experimental work on thematic roles should also be expanded
to a broader range of languages to address both the question of
role abstraction as well as prototypicality. Although Ziegler
and Snedeker (2018) did not find syntactic priming between
goals and recipients in English, such priming may well be
observed for other languages. As described above,
experimental work could also test whether thematic roles
demonstrate prototype effects, such as typicality of
membership and membership uncertainty. It is entirely
possible that, even if all the thematic roles summarized in
this paper are represented in terms of prototypes in a
particular language, the prototypes are not identical across
languages and cultures. Much of the typological and
language emergence evidence reviewed in the second
section documented that agents and patients are strongly
distinguished across languages. However, there may be a
universal bias to distinguish agents and patients, without
these categories having the same prototypes and category
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structure in each culture. In addition, the modeling in White
et al. (2017) raises the possibility that prototypes are more
variable across languages for agents than for patients. If such
variability is attested, it opens a range of questions that have
scarcely been asked: for example, how are event participant
categories molded by culture, environment, and history, and
whether the particular distinctions made in our language affect
our conceptual representations of thematic roles.
Universal biases can influence not only structure within a
category but also relationships across categories. We reviewed
a variety of evidence that some types of roles appear to be
more cognitively prominent than others. As argued by Blake
(1994), there is a general hierarchy concerning which cases
tend to be expressed in languages with inflectional case –
nominative case is most prevalent, followed by accusative
and ergative case, then genitive, dative, and the others (see
also Levin & Rappaport-Hovav, 2005). Role prominence is
also manifest in the argument/adjunct distinction, where
agents and patients are likely to be encoded in syntactically
prominent argument positions, but instruments are more likely
to be encoded in syntactically peripheral adjunct positions
(Rissman et al., 2015; Schutze, 1995; Sedivy & Spivey-
Knowlton, 1994). Asymmetries such as these are not only
reflected in language. As described in the third section, infants
encode sources less robustly than goals, and adults have
poorer memory for sources than goals. Dobel et al. (2007)
demonstrate better naming accuracy for agents than recipients
(see also Wilson, Papafragou, Bunger, & Trueswell, 2011).
Moreover, in his discussion of the Recipient role,
Haspelmath (2011) points out that languages do not tend to
have a large number of physical transfer verbs, cautioning that
we cannot “say with confidence that physical transfer verbs of
possession tend to be the major class” and that “we have to
accept that the comparative concepts R [recipient] and T
[theme] do not capture the same range of phenomena as the
concepts A [agent] and P [patient], and are thus much less
significant” (p. 559). Experimental work across a diverse
range of languages is needed to test whether role asymmetries
can be explained by universal cognitive biases.
Another crucial question for future research concerns
the relationship between thematic roles as linguistic ob-
jects and thematic roles as conceptual categories. As
mentioned previously, the syntax~semantics interface is
variable across languages. This variability is also mani-
fest within a single language. For example, in Rissman
and Rawlins (2017), both use-sentences and with-
sentences entail the presence of an agent – the truth-
conditions of both Chloe used scissors to cut the dress
and Chloe cut the dress with scissors contain the propo-
sition Ag(e) = Chloe. Nonetheless, use and with encode
different instrumental features: use requires an intentional
agent. This variability does not, however, falsify the hy-
pothesis that the category Agent is universal. If we allow
that Ag(e) has prototype structure, where an unintentional
agent is still an Agent, then both use and with are com-
patible with this category. For Agent to truly be univer-
sal, however, it must first be the case that in English, the
categories demonstrated by non-linguistic event cognition
experiments are the same as the categories needed to
account for natural language semantics (e.g., the mean-
ings of use and with). It must then be the case that this
parallelism holds in all languages. If we find any lan-
guage where this parallelism does not hold, this suggests
domain-specific thematic role representations that may be
structured in different ways. A category such as Ag(e),
for example, may need to be relativized to a particular
language or linguistic construction.
Conclusion
One of the fundamental questions of cognitive science con-
cerns the ways in which people categorize the world around
them, and the extent to which humans form similar or different
categories across languages and cultures. From a domain-
general perspective, the study of thematic roles is the study
of event participant categories, and studying these categories
provides an opportunity to gain insight into the interface be-
tween conceptual and semantic knowledge. Many psycholo-
gists working on concept representation do not distinguish
between the semantic category picked out by the particular
English word dog, and categorization of furry, four-legged
domestic animals at a conceptual level. As thematic roles are
largely not labeled through open class lexical items, such con-
flation is not possible in the domain of event participant
categories.
At the outset of this review, we described two poles in
theorizing about thematic roles – thematic roles are part of
core knowledge or they are scholarly fictions. The evidence
we have reviewed from adult psycholinguistics, development,
typology, and emerging sign languages makes it untenable to
maintain the view that thematic roles are fiction. At the same
time, it is also premature to infer the contrary – there is simply
insufficient evidence to conclude that thematic roles as a class
constitute core knowledge. What the data do show is that for
the best-studied roles, there is evidence for abstraction,
scaffolded by universal cognitive biases. The exact nature of
these abstractions – i.e., whether they have the same content
and structure across languages – is not clear. In sum, despite
the substantive literature reviewed herein, many foundational
questions about thematic roles remain unanswered: what the
structure of event participant categories is in individual lan-
guages, and whether, for lesser-studied roles such as
Instrument, there are universal biases. Nonetheless, through
an integration of diverse methods and sources of evidence,
answers to these foundational questions are well within reach.
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